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INFORMATION REPORT

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COUNTRY Austria

SUBJECT

KPOe Debates on the Peace Movement in Austria

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SUPPLEMENT TO REPORT NO.

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- 1. At a special session of the Central Committee of the KPOe on 2 June 1950, Fritz Heinrich and Ernest Fischer reviewed the tactics hitherto used and the results obtained in the Austrian peace campaign. Both reporters felt that the campaign lacked energetic direction and had not been as successful as it could have been. It was determined that about 300,000 signatures had been obtained and that, while 50 per cent of the cadre members had contributed to the effort, the regular Party members had almost completely stopped working.
- 2. Heinrich blamed the press for the disappointing results, stating that Fischer, Erwin Zucker-Schilling, and Fritz Glaubauf had given the impression that the peace campaign was exclusively an affair for intellectuals. Fischer replied that without the cooperation of the press, not even Party members would have known of the campaign. He blamed the Factory and Trade Unions Section, the Cadre Bureau, and the Organization Bureau for not having interested the masses in the movement.
- 3. Franz West, who presided over the meeting, sought to calm the participants, and stated that the reporters' pessimism was unfounded. He called upon all cadre members to put themselves at the disposal of the movement and asserted that by great effort 1,000,000 signatures could still be obtained.
- 4. At a meeting of the Organization Bureau two weeks later there were no recriminations and little criticism of methods and results. It was determined that 450,000 signatures had been obtained and that the participating sections, as well as the general membership, had increased their activity and effectiveness. Only the FOeJ and the solicitors in the Miners' Union and the Metal Workers' Union (outside of USIA) had shown disappointing results.
- 5. A tentative terminal date for the soliciting was set as the end of July, but this could be extended until the first post-vacation session of parliament. It was felt that the 1,000,000 signature goal could still be reached, and that this would have considerable prestige value for the Communist faction in Parliament.

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- 6. As no new special funds were available, the continuance of the campaign would depend largely upon the energy of the cadres and the Organization Bureau, who were to make the campaign their special interest. The special committee for the organization of the campaign would remain in existence, but its work would be subordinate to the Organization Bureau. In both sessions it was pointed out that it was necessary to counteract the usual summer decrease in newspaper circulation, possibly by giving away all unsold copies.
- 7. On 21 June 1950, at a session of the Land Secretaries and District Leaders, Friedrich Hexmann resumed the attack on Ernst Fischer and his intellectuals, declaring that they had deprived the campaign of its mass and class character. He urged an increased tempo in the factories.
- 8. As an indication that the factories will play a larger role in the peace campaign, a movement is now under way to have all factory Peace Councils write to plants not having councils, asking that they be created immediately.
- 9. The peace campaign sessions seem to have followed the usual CP pattern. The Central Committee members were aware that the campaign had not been a smashing success, and the participants accused each other of ineptitude or of uncommunist tactics, but none of the participants doubted the wisdom of the campaign, its general strategy, or its final success.

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